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CRIMINAL LAW-THE TEST OF INSANITY IN CRIMINAL CASES
IN KENTUCKY
An insane person is not responsible for his criminal acts. This
statement in itself represents the recognized law, but it gives rise to
many difficulties and perplexing questions in the criminal law. One of
the most difficult of these questions is a determination of what test
shall be given to the jury by which they may judge the defendant's
sanity or insanity. The purpose of this note is to review the Kentucky
cases on this point.
Graham v. Com.1 was one of the first Kentucky cases which con-
sidered the nature of the instruction to be given to the jury in testing
the sanity of the defendant. In that case the accused brutally killed
his wife with a knife. His sole defense to the charge was that he was
insane when he did the act. The court, relying on the famous
MoNaughton Case,2 sanctioned the following instruction, "The true test
of responsibility is whether the accused had sufficient reason to know
right from wrong, and whether or not he had sufficient power of control
to govern his actions." Next in line of the early cases was Scott v.
Com. in which the defendant killed his son-in-law. The defense was
moral insanity as a result of irresistible impulse. The court held that
this type of insanity had to be received with caution as it was easily
manufactured, but that if it could be proved it was a defense to the
crime. The court further held that for moral insanity to be a defense
to the crime, it must be shown to exist in such violence as to render it
impossible for the party to do otherwise than yield to its promptings. 4
Next in point of time came Smith v. Com. There defendant was
charged with murder and his defense was insanity. In the first part
of the opinion the court passed on the question of drunkenness in crime
in which they held that a person might become so drunk that he would
not be responsible for his crime0 Then with the two previous cases as a
background the court went into a lengthy discussion of insanity in
review the evidence presented by the respondent, analyze and dispose
of his arguments, give convincing reasons for his decision, and dis-
tinguish or reconcile the precedents, he is much more likely to reach
a just and well-considered conclusion than if he is permitted to state
In legal phraseology his ultimate findings of fact and law."
155 Ky. (16 B. Mon.) 587 (1855).
210 Clark and F. 200 (1843). This case laid down the original
so-called "right and wrong" test.
2 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 227, 83 Am. St. Rep. 461 (1863).
' This is the "irresistible impulse" test for determining criminal
responsibility. Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Mind (1925)
232. But for Ky. see McCarty v. Com., 114 Ky. 620, 71 S. W. 656 (1903).
L62 Ky. (1 Duv.) 224 (1864).
.This part of the decision was expressly overruled in Shannahan
v. Coin., 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 463, 8 Am. Rep. 465 (1871). The general
rule is that drunkenness is not defense to crime although it may be
introduced to show the lack of malice or intent in crimes where those
elements are essential. Tripplet v. Com., 272 Ky. 714, 114 S. W. (2d)
108 (1938).
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which they divided it into two types. "Intellectual (mental) insanity,
says the court, is a delusion arising from a pgrtial eclipse of the reason,
or from a morbid perversion of the precipient faculties, which presents
to the abnormal mind, as accredited realities, images of objects that have
no actual existence, or a false and distorted aspect of existing objects.
Although he may have reasoned logically yet he reasons from false
premises." This is the type of insanity in which a person is insane
when he does not know the nature of his acts or does not know right
from wrong.
Whether or not the defendant had sufficient power of control to
govern his actions refers to that type of insanity recognized as moral
insanity or irresistible impulse. The court recognized this type of
insanity by saying at page 231, "Man's moral mentality is the light of
reason which guides him in his pathway of duty and gives him a free
and rational presiding will to enable him, if he so chooses, to keep that
way in defiance of all passion and temptation. In this he is superior
over animals. But man may lack something in his moral mentality
which will not permit him from wandering from the pathway in a
particular direction, as the Homicidial or Kleptomania, in which case
man becomes like an animal and although he may know an act is
wrong yet he can not keep himself from doing it. To that extent he
is insane and is so recognized by the courts." As a result of the fore-
going discussion the court devised the following test of insanity: "The
true test of insanity is whether the accused had sufficient reason to
know right from wrong, and whether or not he had sufficient power
of control to govern his actions." 8 This test was later sanctioned in
Kriel v. Com.,9 and was later followed in several cases.'
But the majority of later cases came to differ from the Smith case
in regard to the kind of moral or irresistible impulse insanity which
would relieve the defendant from responsibility, and in this respect the
court took a step backwards in the progress of the criminal law." In
McCarty v. Com., where the defense to the charge of murder was that
the defendant was prompted to do the act by reason of an irresistible
impulse, the court said on page 626, "The irresistible impulse recognized
by the law is that only resulting from mental disease-from the derange-
ment of the mind caused by a disease of the mind. A person acts under
an insane, irresistible impulse when, by reason of the duress of mental
disease, he has lost the power to choose between right and wrong, to
avoid doing the act in question, his free agency being at the time
destroyed." The court further says that if this were not true then
762 Ky. (1 Duv.) 224, 230 (1864).
8 id., at 231.
168 Ky. (5 Bush) 263 (1869).
ontgomery v. Com., 88 Ky. 509, 11 S. W. 475 (1889); Jolloy v.
Com., 110 Ky. 190, 61 S. W. 49 (1901); Feree v. Com., 193 Ky. 347, 236
S. W. 246 (1922).
1 Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Mind (1925) 239
et seq."114 Ky. 620, 71 S. W. 656 (1903).
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ungovernable temper, or violent, brutish passion, or frenzy caused by
indignation or anger would excuse crime. In Banks v. Com." the
defense was insanity of the type called "paranoia".14 The court held
that, "altho medical writers are generally agreed that there is a well
defined disease called moral insanity, as distinguished from mental
insanity . . ., the doctrine of moral insanity as a protection against
punishment has been repudiated by all courts as dangerous to the
safety of society."
As a result of the change in position of the courts from the type
of moral insanity recognized in the Smith case, a different test as to
that type of insanity has been created. The instruction now adopted as
to that part is, ". . . or that, as a result of mental unsoundness, he had
not then sufficient will power to govern or control his actions, by reason
of some insane impulse which he could not control.""
The complete instruction as to the test of insanity most generally
used in the later cases is taken from Abbott v. Cor." "Before the
defendant can be excused on the grounds of insanity the jury must
believe from the evidence that the defendant was at the time of the
crime without sufficient reason to know right from wrong, or that, as a
result of mental unsoundness, he had not then sufficient will power to
control his actions, by reason of some insane impulse which he could
not resist.""1 The instruction is sometimes differently worded" but it is
substantially the same.
Kentucky follows twenty-two other states" in adopting the test of
insanity as set out above. The test is a combination of the right and
wrong test of Mcaughton's Case plus a consideration of the irresistible
impulse test which arises as a result of mental unsoundness." Twenty-
"145 Ky. 800, 141 S. W. 380 (1911).
"1 Warton and Stitles, Medical Jurisprudence (5th ed. 1905) sec.
1020.
1Mathley v. Com., 120 Ky. 389, 86 S. W. 988 (1905); Cline v. Com.,
248 Ky. 609, 59 S. W. (2d) 577 (1933).
"107 Ky. 624, 55 S. W. 196 (1900).
27Farris v. Com. 1 S. W. 729 (1886); McCarty v. Com., 14 Ky.
L. R. 285, 20 S. W. 229 (1892); Hays v. Corn., 17 Ky. L. R. 1147, 33
S. W. 1104 (1896); Jolly v. Com., 110 Ky. 190, 61 S. W. 49 (1901); Hall
v. Com., 155 Ky. 544, 159 S. W. 1155 (1913); Thompson v. Com., 155
Ky. 333, 159 S. W. 829 (1913); Mitra v. Com., 224 Ky. 13, 5 S. W. (2d)
275 (1928); Miller v. Com., 236 Ky. 448, 33 S. W. (2d) 590 (1930); Cline
v. Com., 248 Ky. 609, 59 S. W. (2d) 577 (1933).
"Montgomery v. Com., 83 Ky. 509, 11 S. W. 475 (1889); Mangum
v. Com., 19 Ky. L. R. 94, 39 S. W. 703 (1897); Portwood v. Com., 104 Ky.
496, 47 S. W. 339 (1898); Feree v. Com., 193 Ky. 347, 236 S. W. 246
(1922); Souther v. Com., 209 Ky. 70, 272 S. W. 26 (1925) ; Berry v. Com.,
227 Ky. 528, 13 S. W. (2d) 521 (1929); Lindsey v. Com., 230 Ky. 718,
20 S. W. (2d) 979 (1929).
1" Glueck, Mental Disorder and the Criminal Mind (1925) 267.
SGlueck in his classification lists Ky. as one of the states which
considers irresistible impulse in determining insanity. In this he is
wrong because the case cited by him sustains the view that irresistible
Impulse as recognized by the Kentucky court must be based on mental
unsoundness, and Glueck agrees that this type of irresistible impulse
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four states?' still follow the strict right and wrong test, and one, New
Hampshire,2 follows a rule of its own where no involved test of insanity
is used.
For several years judges and lawyers have been dissatisfied as to
the test for determining responsibility on the grounds of insanity as
used by the courts. = The test as used by the Kentucky court has been
subject to very severe criticism and it is now generally agreed that
this test is inadequate for use in our modern law. This test for deter-
mining insanity was adopted when the law believed everyone to be
either sane or insane and therefore the judges felt that the layman
could properly decide this question.' Psychiatry has proven that
everyone is not sane or insane; now the medical world recognizes many
degrees and types of insanity so that now'it is impossible to classify a
person as sane or insane.'5 As a result, those judges who continue to
advocate the right and wrong test are thereby resisting any attempt
made to keep legal thought abreast of medical and psychological
advances.28
Glueck shows that the test for determining insanity as adopted in
Kentucky and elsewhere is based on the conception that lack of knowl-
edge of right and wrong is the sole or important symptom of insanity,
and that this knowledge, or the lack of it, is the only difference between
a sane and insane person. He then goes on to show that this conception
is itself erroneous in the light of present day knowledge on the subject. "
Another well founded objection to the tests of insanity now in use by
the courts is that they are merely a statement of a few symptoms lead-
ing to a belief that a person might be insane.
In stating these few of the many objections to the right and wrong
and irresistible impulse tests, the writer has merely intended to indicate
the unrest in respect to them. In the light of the above criticism it is
is not the kind, recognized by psychiatrists but is only a step toward it
from the stricter right and wrong test. Glueck, op. cit. supra note 19,
at 239.
SGlueck, op. cit. s pra note 19, at 227.
' Glueck, op. cit. supra note 19, at 254, for a discussion of the
New Hampshire rule.
" Report of the Committee of the American Bar Association on
Psychiatric Jurisprudence for the year 1928-1929, 1.2'Tulin, L. A., The Problem of Mental Disorder in Crime (1932)
32 Col. L. Rev. 933.
",Tulin, op. cit. supra note 24, at 933. See also Banks v. Com., 145
Ky. .800, 141 S. W. 380 (1911) where the court admitted that the medical
world was agreed that there was a well defined disease called moral
insanity (paranoia in the particular case), yet they refused to accept it
as a legal fact on the doubtful ground that to recognize such insanity
as a protection against punishment might be dangerous to society.
(1931) 22 J. Crim. L. 438.
Glueck, Crime and Justice (1936) 100 et. seq. This objection is
apparent in the discussion of the court in Smith v. Com., 62 Ky. (1
Duv.) 224 (1864); and Abbott v. Com., 107 Ky. 624, 55 S. W. 196 (1900).2 9Keedy, Criminal Responsibility of the Insane (1921) 12 J. Crim.
L. 14 at 15.
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apparent that a new method of testing the sanity of persons accused
of crime is needed. What that method or test should be is a question
this writer does not propose to answer. As has been said, "They (the
psychiatrists and psychologists) inform us that an exact definition,
exact enough for law, that is, for use in trial is impossible. The present
definition is unscientific but science is not yet ready to frame a new
one." JAMES D. ALLEN
WILLS-ATTESTATION IN THE PRESENCE OF THE TESTATOR
I
OnJrr AND RESULT OF THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT
"Attestation and subscription in the presence of the testator is a
common requirement of both the Statute of Frauds' and of the Statute
of Wills 2 and, accordingly, of most American statutes." 3 Superficially,
it has been said that "the design of the legislature in making this
requisition evidently was that the testator might have ocular evidence
of the identity of the instrument subscribed by the witnesses."4 Such
a narrow view of the purpose of the statute has been reflected in the
cases, as will be presently shown. Professor Page has suggeste that
it is unlikely that the statute, in its common form, prevents forgery,
perjury, or fraud. Perhaps the primary object of the statute is to
make it sure that the genuine will executed by the testator is the
same one that is attested and subscribed, and that some other writing
is not substituted in place of it.6 A strict interpretation of the
statute has, in many instances, resulted in the failure of wills which
undoubtedly expressed the testator's desires.7 The statement of the
Report of the Committee of the American Bar Association on
Psychiatric Jurisprudence for the year 1928-1829, 5.
129 Car. 11, c. 3, sec. V (1677).
2 Wm. IV & I Vict. c. 26 (1837).
Percy Bordwell, The Statute Law of Wills, (1923) 14 Ia. L. Rev.
1, 15.
'1 Jarman on Wills 107 (7th. ed., 1930).
1 Page on Wills, Sec. 334 (2nd ed., 1926).
"Calkins v. Calkins, 216 Ill. 458, 75 N. E. 182 (1905), noted (1905) 4
Mich. L. Rev. 246; Dubach v. Jolly, 279 Ill. 530, 117 N. E. 77 (1917).
'Gordon v. Gilmer, 141 Ga. 347, 80 S. E. 1007 (1914) (will invalid
because testator's vision obstructed by curtain or footboard of his bed) ;
Drury v. Connell, 177 Ill. 43, 52 N. E. 368 (1898) (testator must be able
to see witnesses sign, though they are in same room); Snyder v. Steele,
2S7 IIl. 159, 122 N. E. 520 (1919) (it was error to instruct that it was
enough for testatrix to be able to see witnesses and enough of act to
know that they were signing); Walker v. Walker, 174 N. E. 541 (Ill.
1931) (testatrix thirty-five feet away could see witnesses through
window-will held improperly executed), noted (1931) 16 Ia. L. Rev.
560; Burney v. Allen, 125 N. C. 314, 34 S. E. 500 (1399) (testator must
be in position to see paper as well as witnesses), noted (1900) 13 Harv.
L. Rev. 530; In re Jones' Estate, 101 Wash. 128. 172 Pac. 206 (1918)
(subscription by witnesses must be within scope of testator's vision
